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ABSTRACT
Increasingly, local governments compete by offering substantial subsidies to industrial plants to
locate within their jurisdictions. This paper uses a novel research design to examine the
consequences of successfully bidding for a plant on county-level labor earnings, property values,
and public finances. Each issue of the corporate real estate journal Site Selection includes an article
titled "The Million Dollar Plant" that describes how a large plant decided where to locate. These
articles report the county where the plant chose to locate (i.e., the 'winner'), as well as the one or two
runner-up counties (i.e., the 'losers'). The losers are counties that have survived a long selection
process, but narrowly lost the competition. We use these revealed rankings of profit-maximizing
firms to form a counterfactual for what would have happened in the winner counties in the absence
of the plant opening.
We find that a plant opening is associated with a 1.5% trend break in labor earnings in the new
plant's industry in winning counties (relative to losing ones) after the opening of the plant (relative
to the period before the opening). Property values may provide a summary measure of the net
change in welfare, because the costs and benefits of attracting a plant should be capitalized into the
price of land. We find a positive, relative trend break of 1.1% in property values. Further, we fail
to find any deterioration in local governments' financial position. Overall, the results undermine the
popular view that the provision of local subsidies to attract large industrial plants reduces local
residents' welfare.
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Over the past 30 years, state and local governments have assumed a greater responsibility for 
economic development.  For example, they frequently offer substantial subsidies to businesses to locate 
within their jurisdictions.  These incentives can include tax breaks, low-cost or free land, the issuance of 
tax-exempt bonds, training funds, the construction of roads, and other infrastructure investments.  Local 
politicians and the subsidized companies usually extol the benefits of these deals, while critics complain 
that they are a waste of public monies.  It is difficult to evaluate these competing claims, because there is 
little systematic evidence on the consequences of these policies.
1   
The traditional approach to evaluating policies designed at attracting new plants is to calculate the 
number of jobs gained and the cost of the tax breaks awarded to firms.  For example, it is widely cited 
that Mercedes received a $250 million ($165,000 per job) incentive package for locating in Vance, 
Alabama, the Toyota plant in Georgetown, Kentucky was awarded $200 million ($80,000 per job) and 
Boeing was given $50 million ($100,000 per job) in tax abatements to locates its corporate headquarters 
in Chicago (Mitol 2001; Trogen 2002).  This “accounting” approach produces eye-catching statistics, but 
it has two important limitations.  First, these calculations are done ex-ante and are rarely verified.   
Second, and more fundamentally, this approach does not offer a framework for determining whether the 
policies increase or decrease welfare of local residents.  For example, is $165,000 per job a good deal for 
the residents of Vance, Alabama?         
Economic theory provides mixed results on this question, as emphasized by Glaeser (2001) in a 
recent survey.
2  On the one hand, some models suggest that the attraction of new businesses generates 
positive spillovers and/or increases producer surplus.  In these cases, local subsidies may be welfare 
enhancing or, at least, neutral for local residents.  On the other hand, there are models that indicate that 
local subsidies may reflect government officials’ private interests by providing for their own financial 
gain or satisfying Leviathan goals.  In these settings, local government officials grant subsidies whose 
costs to local residents are larger than the benefits and therefore reduce residents’ welfare. 
In this paper, we empirically assess the consequences for counties of successfully bidding for 
large industrial plants on county-level earnings, property values, and government finances.  The empirical 
challenge is that plants choose to locate where their expected profits are highest, which are a function of 
                                                            
1 In a recent survey of the literature, Glaeser (2001) concludes that, although location based-incentives 
“seem to be a permanent part of the urban economic landscape, economists do not yet know why these 
incentives occur and whether they are in fact desirable”.  Further a Standard & Poor’s publication states, 
“Economic development wars of recent years have not developed a sufficient track record to assess their 
true cost-benefit ratio” (Standard & Poor’s 1993).  Bartik (1991) provides the most comprehensive 
evidence. 
2 See also the classic Oates (1972) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) papers on tax competitions and 
the provision of local public goods.  Wilson (1999) provides another recent review of this literature.    their location-specific expected future costs of production and any subsidies.  A plant’s expected future 
costs of production in a county depend on many unobservable factors, including the presence of a suitable 
transportation infrastructure, the availability of workers with particular skills, and the local regulatory 
environment.  These factors are typically difficult to measure and their relative importance varies across 
plants based on the generally unobserved plant-specific production functions.  Similarly, the subsidies are 
likely to be a function of a number of unmeasured factors, including any potential spillovers and the 
degree of local politicians’ malfeasance.   
Heterogeneity in the factors that determine variation in costs of production and subsidies across 
counties is likely to bias standard estimators. Valid estimates of the impact of a plant opening require the 
identification of a county that is identical to the county where the plant decided to locate in both expected 
future production costs and the factors that determine subsidies.  We have little faith in our ability to 
ascertain and measure all these factors. 
As a solution, we rely on the revealed rankings of profit-maximizing firms to identify a valid 
counterfactual for what would have happened in the absence of the plant opening.  These rankings come 
from the corporate real estate journal Site Selection, which includes a regular feature titled the “Million 
Dollar Plants” that describes how a large plant decided where to locate.  When firms are considering 
where to open a large plant, they typically begin by considering dozens of possible locations. They 
subsequently narrow the list to roughly 10 or so locations, among which 2 or 3 finalists are selected. The 
“Million Dollar Plants” articles report the county that the plant ultimately chose (i.e., the ‘winner’), as 
well as the one or two runner-up counties (i.e., the ‘losers’).  The losers are counties that have survived a 
long selection process, but narrowly lost the competition. Our identifying assumption is that the losers 
form a valid counterfactual for the winners, after adjustment for differences in pre-existing trends.  Even 
if this assumption is invalid, we suspect that this pairwise sampling approach is preferable to comparing 
winners to the other 3,000 U.S. counties.   
Using the County Business Patterns data file, we test for an association between the plant opening 
and the total wage bill (and employment).  Importantly, in the 8 years before the opening of the plant, the 
trend in the wage bill in the winner counties is virtually identical to the trend in the wage bill in the loser 
counties. This lends some credibility to our main identifying assumption that the losers form a valid 
counterfactual for the winners. 
The primary employment result is that in the new plant’s 1-digit industry the trend in the wage 
bill increased by a statistically significant $16.8 million in winning counties (relative to losing ones) after 
the plant’s opening (relative to the period before the opening).  This is 1.5% of the average wage bill in 
the plant’s 1-digit industry in winner counties in the year before the opening.  Taken literally, this implies 
that six years later the wage bill in the new plant’s 1-digit industry is roughly $100 million higher due to 
  2 the plant opening than predicted by pre-existing trends.  We also find evidence of positive trend breaks in 
the total wage bill in other industries in winner counties and in counties that neighbor winners, although 
the precision of these estimates precludes definitive conclusions.
3   
These results convincingly suggest that the successful attraction of a new plant directly and 
indirectly increases local economic activity.  However, they are not informative about whether the 
subsides increase local residents’ welfare because they do not account for the cost of the subsidies.  Direct 
information of the cost of the subsidies is unavailable.  We follow the stylized Roback (1982) model and 
argue that the net welfare effect of attracting a plant will be reflected in property values.  This is because 
property values capitalize the increased economic activity in the county (i.e. the benefit of the subsidy) 
and the increase in property taxes--or reduction in public services--necessary to pay for the subsidy (i.e. 
the cost of the subsidy).
4   
We show that in the presence of bidding for plants by counties, a successful bid may cause 
property values to increase, decrease or remain unchanged.  When counties are homogeneous and 
politicians solely maximize residents’ welfare, the successful attraction of a plant will leave property 
values unchanged.  This is because counties raise their bids until the costs equal the benefits and they are 
indifferent about winning or losing.  When counties are not homogenous or if states pay for part of the 
subsidy, the successful attraction of a plant may result in increased property values. This is because the 
county that has the most attractive characteristics or the largest contribution from state government can 
bid less than the second best county, and still win the plant. Finally when local politicians derive private 
benefits from granting subsidies, they will overbid, and property values may decrease.  
Ultimately, the question of the effect of successfully attracting a plant on property values is an 
empirical one.  Using a unique self-collected data file on property values, we find that the successful 
attraction of a plant results in increased property values. Specifically, we find that in winning counties 
there is a relative trend break of approximately 1.1% in annual property values after the plant’s opening.  
This finding undermines the popular view that the provision of local subsidies to attract large industrial 
plants decreases welfare.   
  Lastly, we turn to the effect of local subsidies on local government finances. A popular concern 
about the provision of subsidies is that local governments pay for them by cutting important services, 
                                                            
3 See Hanson (1998) for evidence that shocks in a given locale affect neighboring jurisdictions and that 
this effect dissipates with distance. See Chapter 2 of Bartik (1991) for a review of the effects of state and 
local economic development programs on employment and economic growth in local areas.  On a related 
topic, Evans and Topoleski (2002) examine the social and economics consequences of the opening of an 
Indian casino. 
4 Gyourko and Tracy (1991) demonstrate that the efficient provision of public services is capitalized into 
land.  They find that with services held constant, higher taxes are associated with lower land values.  
  3 such as education and police protection.
5  Using data from the Annual Survey of Governments, we find 
that local governments in winning counties experienced positive and roughly equal trend breaks in 
revenues and expenditures.  Notably, there is a substantial increase in education spending and no change 
in police expenditures.  Overall, there is little evidence of deterioration in the provision of vital public 
services in counties that win “Million Dollar” plants. 
  We want to emphasize that the focus of this paper is on the effect of attracting new plants on local 
communities. We are interested in credibly estimating the consequences for a county of successfully 
bidding for a new plant.  An analysis of whether states or the nation as a whole benefit from tax 
competition to attract new business is beyond the scope of this paper.   
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I reviews the theoretical explanations for the provision of 
local subsidies by local governments to attract plants and the determinants of plants’ location decisions.  
It also provides a case study of BMW’s decision to locate a new plant in South Carolina and intuitively 
describes our research design.  Section II reviews the Roback (1982) model in the context of a plant 
opening and presents a stylized model of counties’ decisions to bid for a plant and the effect of winning 
on property values.  Section III describes the data sources and presents some summary statistics.  Section 
IV explains the econometric model and Section V describes the results.  Section VI interprets the results 
and VII concludes. 
  
I. Local Subsidy and Plant Location Decisions 
This section is divided into two parts.  The first reviews the existing theoretical literature on why 
local governments use incentives to attract some plants to their jurisdictions.  The second subsection 
provides a case study of BMW’s decision to locate a car assembly plant in the Greenville-Spartanburg 
area of northwestern South Carolina and, more generally, describes the intuition of our research design.   
 
A.  Why do Local Governments Offer Subsidies to Some New Plants? 
In standard models, the provision of incentives to firms reduces the welfare of a locality’s residents.
6  
This is because the incentives lead to inefficiently high levels of local production.  Yet, in the real world, 
large businesses frequently receive subsidies in exchange for their location decision.  The implication is 
that the standard models may be unable to capture an important feature of these location decisions.  Here, 
we review a recent line of research that provides a number of possible explanations for why localities 
                                                            
5 Glaeser (2001) emphasizes the importance of answering this question empirically, “Economists need to 
estimate what happens when localities are deprived of the marginal dollar.  Does this loss lead to 
eliminating very valuable services or are fairly marginal services cut off?”  (pp. 11-12).   
6 There are a number of definitions of incentives.  We borrow from Glaeser (2001) and define them to be 
firm-specific tax packages.  See Wilson (1999) for a review of the theoretical literatures on tax incentives.   
  4 provide incentives to newly locating firms.  This review aims to highlight some of the “structural” forces 
that are likely to underlie our “reduced-form” estimates of the welfare consequences of successfully 
attracting a plant.
7  
The first set of theories emphasizes the idea that local governments aim to maximize only the 
welfare of their residents.  One example is the case where agglomeration economies are associated with 
the location of the firm.  For example, firms in the same industry may experience productivity increases 
as the number or size of geographically concentrated firms increase (Henderson 2003; Garcia-Mila and 
McGuire 2001).  These spillovers may be due to the sharing of information, the number of high skilled 
workers (Rauch 1993; Glaeser et al. 1995; Moretti 2002), or that the new firms will attract other firms in 
the future.  Regardless of their source, in the presence of these spillovers, localities will bid to attract the 
firms that produce them and the resulting subsidies allow the firm to capture the spillovers that they 
produce. 
Glaeser (2001) suggests that local incentives may represent bids by communities to attract firms 
that will generate producer surplus for the current residents of the community.  Conventional welfare 
analysis suggests that there may be welfare triangles to be gained by local workers. In particular, if the 
labor supply curve is upward sloping, inframarginal workers are made better off by the presence of the 
new firm. The size of the bids will reflect the welfare gains generated.
 8   
Another explanation for tax incentives is that these upfront payments are compensation for future 
tax payments (Wilson 1996).  In particular, once a plant begins to operate at a site it can be costly to 
change its location, because of the “sunk” nature of many industrial investments (see e.g., Goolsbee and 
Gross 2000 and Ramey and Shapiro 2001).  The resulting immobility makes firms easy targets for local 
tax collectors.  Since it is difficult for governments to credibly commit in advance to future tax rates, the 
upfront tax incentives compensate firms for future expropriation.   
   All of the previous theories are consistent with local politicians solely acting in the interests of 
their citizens, but an alternative view is that local incentives are due to corruption and influence or a 
desire on the politician’s part to maximize the size of government.  In the case of corruption and 
influence, the side-payments may occur through direct payoffs, contributions to re-election campaigns, or 
future employment for politicians or their friends or family (Glaeser 2001).  The magnitude of these 
bribes will depend on the probability of detection and the punishment.  An alternative possibility is 
derived from the Leviathan view of government (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).  As applied to this case, 
politicians will seek to maximize the welfare of their citizens and the size of government or the tax base.   
                                                            
7 This review follows a recent paper by Glaeser (2001). See that paper for further details. 
  5 For the purposes of our paper, it is worth noting that the first set of models--where local subsidies 
are motivated by agglomeration economies or increases in producer surplus or compensation for ex-post 
appropriation--suggest that subsidies may be welfare enhancing or, at least, neutral for local residents. 
(We will show later under what conditions subsidies can be welfare enhancing or welfare neutral.) The 
second set of models--where local subsidies reflect government officials’ private interests--suggest that 
subsidies may be welfare decreasing. We return to this point in Section II, where we incorporate these 
two alternative views in a simple theoretical framework.  
 
B. A Case Study of the BMW Plant Location Decision and a New Research Design 
  In this subsection, we use a concrete example to illustrate how a particular firm selected a site for 
its new plant. In particular, we use information from the “Million Dollar Plant” series in the corporate real 
estate journal Site Selection to describe BMW’s 1992 decision to site a manufacturing plant in the 
Greenville-Spartanburg area of South Carolina.  Notably, this is one of the plants in our sample. A second 
goal of this case study is to highlight the empirical difficulties that arise when estimating the effect of 
plant openings on local economies.  Further, we use this case study to informally explain why our 
research design may circumvent these identification problems.  A more formal analysis is conducted in 
Section II.  
After overseeing a worldwide competition and considering 250 potential sites for its new plant, 
BMW announced in 1991 that they had narrowed the list of potential candidates to 20 counties.  Six 
months later, BMW announced that the two finalists in the competition were Greenville-Spartanburg, 
South Carolina, and Omaha, Nebraska. Finally, in 1992 BMW announced that they would site the plant in 
Greenville-Spartanburg and that they would receive a package of incentives worth approximately $115 
million funded by the state and local governments. 
Why did BMW choose Greenville-Spartanburg?  It seems reasonable to assume that firms are 
profit maximizers and choose to locate where their expectation of the present discounted value of the 
stream of future profits is greatest.  Two factors determine their expected future profits.  The first is the 
plant’s expected future costs of production in a location, which is a function of the location’s expected 
supply of inputs and the firm’s production technology.  The second factor is the present discounted value 
of the subsidy it receives at the site.  
The BMW case provides a rare opportunity to observe the determinants of these two key site-
selection factors. Consider first the county’s expected supply of inputs. According to BMW, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 It is also possible that the new firm generates consumer surplus for the residents.  The consumer gains 
are possible if there are local markets for outputs (e.g., sports teams). Because we focus mainly on 
manufacturing plants, this possibility is less relevant for our purposes. 
  6 characteristics that made Greenville-Spartanburg more attractive than the other 250 sites initially 
considered were: low union density, a supply of qualified workers; the numerous global firms, including 
58 German companies, in the area; the high quality transportation infrastructure, including air, rail, 
highway, and port access; and access to key local services. 
For our purposes, the important point to note here is that these county characteristics are a first 
potential source of unobserved heterogeneity.  While these characteristics are well documented in the 
BMW case, they are generally unknown.  If these characteristics also affect the outcomes of interest (i.e., 
labor earnings, property values and county finances), a standard regression that compares Greenville-
Spartanburg with the other 3000 US counties will yield biased estimates of the effect of the plant opening. 
For example if counties that have more attractive characteristics (e.g., better transportation infrastructure) 
tend to have better outcomes (e.g., higher earnings), then a standard regression will overestimate the 
effect of plant openings on outcomes.  
Now, consider the second determinant of BMW’s decision, the subsidy.  The BMW “Million 
Dollar Plant” article explains why the Greenville-Spartanburg and South Carolina governments were 
willing to provide BMW with $115 million in subsidies.
9  According to local officials, the facility’s 
estimated five-year economic impact on the region was $2 billion (although this number surely does not 
account for opportunity cost).  As a part of this $2 billion, the plant was expected to create 2,000 direct 
and lead to another 2,000 in related industries by the late 1990s.
10  As we argued in subsection A, 
Greenville-Spartanburg’s subsidy for BMW may be rationalized by the 2000 “spillover” jobs indirectly 
created by the new plant.  As an example, Magna International began construction on an $80 million plant 
that was to produce roofs, side panels, doors and other major pieces for the BMW plant in 1993.
11   
It is notable that some counties may benefit more from a particular plant, depending on their 
industrial structure, labor force skills, unemployment rate and all the other factors that affect spillovers.  
For this reason, the factors that determine the total size of the spillover (and presumably the size of the 
subsidy) represent a second potential source of unobserved heterogeneity.  If this unobserved 
heterogeneity is correlated with outcomes, standard regression equations will be misspecified due to 
omitted variables, just as described above.  For example, if counties that have more to gain in terms of 
                                                            
9 Ben Haskew, chairman of the Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce, summarized the local view when he 
said, “The addition of the company will further elevate an already top-rated community for job growth” 
(Venable, 1992, p. 630). 
10 Interestingly, BMW later decided to open a second plant in the Greenville-Spartanburg area and 
relocated its U.S. headquarters from New Jersey to South Carolina. 
11 Although the Magna Plant was slated to hire 300 workers, state and local governments only provided 
about $1.5 million in incentives.  Interestingly, the incentives offered to Magna are substantially smaller 
(even on a proportional basis) than those received by BMW, implying that local governments appear to be 
judicious in concentrating the incentives on plants that are likely to have the largest spillovers. 
  7 spillovers (and therefore offer more generous subsidies) also have better outcomes, then a regression that 
compares the winners with the other 3000 US counties will overestimate the effect of plant openings on 
outcomes. 
In order to make valid inferences in the presence of these two forms of heterogeneity, knowledge 
of the exact form of the selection rule that determines plants’ location decisions is generally necessary.  
As the BMW example demonstrates, the two factors that determine plant location decisions—the 
expected future supply of inputs in a county and the magnitude of the subsidy--are generally unknown to 
researchers and in the rare cases where they are known they are difficult to measure.  In short, we have 
little faith in our ability to ascertain and measure all this information.  Thus, the effect of a plant opening 
is very likely to be confounded by differences in factors that determine the plants’ profitability at the 
chosen location.   
  As a solution to this identification problem, we rely on the revealed rankings of profit-
maximizing firms to identify a valid counterfactual for what would have happened in the absence of the 
plant opening.  In particular, the “Million Dollar Plants” articles typically report the county that the plant 
chose (i.e., the ‘winner’), as well as its 2
nd choice (i.e., the ‘loser’). For example, in the BMW case, the 
loser is Omaha, Nebraska.  In the subsequent analysis we assume that the winner and loser counties are 
identical in expected future profits, controlling for differences in pre-existing trends.  Although this 
assumption is unlikely to hold exactly, we suspect that this pairwise approach is preferable to using 
regression adjustment to compare the winners to the other 3,000 U.S. counties or a matching procedure 
based on observable variables.
12 In Section V, we present empirical evidence that suggests that this 
identifying assumption may be valid. 
 
II. Land Prices and Welfare When Counties Bids for Plants 
This section presents a simple framework that guides the empirical analysis and helps to interpret 
the resulting estimates.  One of the paper’s empirical goals is to test whether the successful attraction of a 
new plant affects housing prices.  The first subsection presents a stylized model that specifies some 
assumptions under which the change in land values induced by the exogenous opening of a plant can be 
interpreted as a change in residents’ welfare.  In the second subsection, we allow counties to bid for plants 
and specify some assumptions about the bidding process.  The goal of this subsection is to show under 
what conditions a successful bid for a plant will result in higher or lower property values (and therefore 
welfare).   
                                                            
12 Propensity score matching is an alternative approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  Its principal 
shortcoming relative to our approach is its assumption that the treatment (i.e., winner status) is 
  8  
A. Land Prices and Welfare   
Here, we follow the stylized Roback (1982) model, which is often used to model firm location 
decisions.  We assume that individuals are perfectly mobile, have identical tastes and a fixed labor supply.  
Further, they rent land for homes in the county where they work.  All firms are assumed to have constant 
returns to scale technologies and there is a fixed supply of land in each county.
13  In equilibrium, firm’s 
unit costs equal the nationally determined product price and individuals’ utility cannot be increased by 
moving to a different county.   
Now, suppose that a county is exogenously assigned a new plant.  This case may be unrealistic, 
but it is a useful starting point for expository purposes.  Importantly, all other producers and all workers 
continue to choose their location to maximize profits and utility, respectively.   
The opening of the new plant causes land values and nominal wages to increase in the county. 
The increase in land values occurs for two reasons. First, the new plant will directly increase the demand 
through its land purchase and by increasing the number of workers who need housing.  Second, if there 
are agglomeration economies, the presence of the new plant will lower the costs of production for other 
firms in the county.  In this case, firms will bid up the price of land to gain access to the spillovers.  In 
order to retain workers, firms must pay higher wages to compensate them for the higher rental rate of 
land.  This is necessary because in equilibrium workers’ utility must be constant across counties.
14     
With this set-up, the increase in land values provides a one-time gain to property owners in the 
county that receives the new plant.  This is the only change in welfare experienced by the county’s 
residents because workers’ utility is unchanged and the higher rental rate of land counterbalances any 
spillovers available to firms.  Thus, under these assumptions, changes in land values translate one-to-one 
in changes in residents’ welfare.   
 
B. A Stylized Model of Bidding for Plants and Land Values 
In the previous subsection, the opening of a new plant increased property values because we 
assumed that the county does not have to incur any costs to attract the plant.  In practice, local 
governments frequently provide subsidies in exchange for a plant’s location decision.  In this subsection, 
and the remainder of the paper, we consider the possibility that the 3,000 U.S. counties compete for the 
new plant by offering subsidies or bids.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“ignorable” conditional on the observables. As it should be clear from the example, adjustment for 
observable variables through the propensity score is unlikely to be sufficient. 
13 See Hoehn, Berger, and Blomquist (1987) for a model that allows for flexible city boundaries. 
14 This implies that real wages are unchanged. 
  9 We assume that a county’s residents elect a mayor that acts as their agent to bid to attract plants 
to its jurisdiction.  A successful bid involves a trade-off for the county.  On the one hand, subsidies are 
costly to the county, because they involve the provision of services and may reduce the future stream of 
tax revenues.  The increase in public services includes the special services for the new plant stipulated by 
the incentive package (e.g., the construction of roads, or other infrastructure investments, tax abatements, 
job training funds, provision of low-cost or free land, the issuance of tax-exempt bonds, provision of 
cheap electric power, etc.), as well as the standard public services (e.g., garbage removal and police 
protection).  We assume that the county’s incentive package is financed by property taxes, so that its cost 
is capitalized into land values.
15   
On the other hand, the new plant directly increases the level of economic activity in the county, 
which raises the value of land.  As the BMW case demonstrates, the presence of the new plant may also 
raise the value of land indirectly by generating spillovers, if, for example, it attracts other plants and/or 
lowers the costs of production for other plants.  Thus, property values capitalize both the costs (i.e., the 
increased property taxes and/or reduced services) and benefits (i.e., the increased economic activity) of 
attracting the plant. 
This subsection’s goal is to theoretically analyze when the successful attraction of a plant will 
increase or decrease property values (and therefore welfare) in the presence of county bidding.  We 
denote property values as P, and assume that the change in the present discounted value of property 
values for the winning county can be expressed as ∆Pij = Vij – Cij.  Vij denotes the benefit of new plant j 
for county i, and it is equivalent to the increase in property values (in the absence of a subsidy).  The size 
of this benefit is exogenous to the county and is known to all the other counties bidding on the plant.  Cij 
is the cost to the county of the subsidy provided to the plant.  In the real world, it is often the case that the 
state bears part of the cost of the incentive package, so the total subsidy received by the plant is Bij = Cij + 
Sij, where Sij denotes the state’s contribution. We assume that S is exogenous to the county and is 
provided by the state to account for the benefits to other counties in the state. 
The plants are the other side of this two-sided matching problem and we assume that they will 
locate in the county where their future profits are maximized.  As described above, two factors determine 
their expected future profits in a given county: the subsidy and the expected future costs of production in 
that county.  It is likely that there is heterogeneity in the maximum subsidy that counties are willing to 
offer, due to differences in counties characteristics (recall Section I-B).  In order to obtain the highest 
subsidy, we assume that the firms conduct an English auction in the presence of independent, or private, 
values.  We further assume that there is not any collusion in the bidding among counties.  
                                                            
15 In the Annual Survey of Governments data, property taxes account for 49% of total revenues from own 
sources. For comparison, total sales and gross receipts taxes account for only 4.5% of total revenues.  
  10 The firm’s choice also depends on the location-specific production costs.  It is likely that there is 
heterogeneity in a plant’s valuation of a county due to differences in the expected supply of future inputs.  
In the BMW case, recall these factors included the presence of qualified workers, the presence of German 
companies and air, rail, highway, and port access.  We denote the value to the firm of all these factors as 
Zij.  A higher Zij implies that production costs of firm j are lower in county i.  We assume that Z is 
exogenous to the county.  
Overall, the total value for a firm of locating in a particular county is the sum of the subsidy and 
the county-specific cost advantages.  We assume that a plant will select the county where this sum, Bij + 
Zij, is maximized.        
1. Homogeneous Counties.  In general, counties differ in their valuations of a new plant, Vij, and 
the plants’ valuation of the county, Zij.  Here, we begin by considering the case where counties are 
homogeneous so that Vij = V0 and Zij = Z0 for all i.  This would be the case if our key identifying 
assumption that winners and losers are identical were valid.  The homogeneity case is important because 
in our empirical analysis, we will retain the homogeneity assumption when comparing winners and losers. 
Later, we analyze the more general model that allows for heterogeneity in V and Z to investigate how our 
conclusions differ if this identification assumption is not valid.   Under homogeneity, the firm simply 
chooses the county that offers the highest subsidy, B. We consider four cases. 
Case 1.  This case is the simplest.  We assume that the county’s mayor maximizes residents’ 
welfare and the state provides no subsidy (i.e., S = 0).  The mayor raises the bid until she is indifferent 
between winning and losing.  Formally, the equilibrium bid, B*, is determined by  
(1)  B* = V0  
Consequently, ∆P = V0 – B* = 0 and the successful attraction of the plant does not change land prices or 
residents’ welfare.  
Case 2.  We now allow states to subsidize the incentives offered to the plant but retain the other 
assumptions.  It is possible that different states provide different level of incentives if, for example, the 
magnitude of spillovers in neighboring counties differs across states.  Here, the county that receives the 
most generous incentive from the state will win the new plant.  The mayor of the county located in the 
most generous state does not need to raise the bid until she is indifferent between having the plant and not 
having the plant.  She can win the plant by setting the county’s bid at the point that makes the mayor of 
the county with the second most generous state subsidy indifferent between winning and losing. The 
optimal bid B* is 
(2)   B* = V0 + Smax-1 
where Smax-1 is the incentive provided by the second most generous state.  
  11 The state subsidy is effectively shared between the plant and the winning county.  The portion of 
this rent that goes to the county is capitalized in land values. Specifically, land values increase by the 
difference between the state subsidy provided by the most and 2
nd most generous states: ∆P = V0 – (B*-
Smax) = Smax - Smax-1 >0, where Smax is the incentive provided by the most generous state.  Importantly, the 
source of the increase in housing values is the heterogeneity in the state subsidies and the county’s 
capture of part of the state subsidy.  It is not due to winning the plant. 
Case 3. We now allow for the possibility that the mayor may have her own goals.  In particular, 
we assume the mayor benefits from a higher incentive package because opportunities for graft or 
enlarging government are increasing in B.  We define this personal benefit as T=f(B), with f’>0: the 
higher the subsidy provided by the mayor to the firm, the larger the kickback.  Due to an exogenously 
determined probability of detection and punishment, the mayor chooses B to maximize her utility U, 
which depends on residents’ increase in welfare ∆P and her benefit T: U = U(∆P, T); where U1 > 0 and U2 
≥ 0.  In the case where U2 = 0, there is no principal-agent problem and the mayor’s and residents’ interests 
are perfectly aligned.  If U2 > 0, the mayor’s objective function includes residents’ welfare as well as her 
own private gain from the subsidy.  For simplicity, we assume that U(∆P,T) is separable in its first and 
second argument and T is a fixed fraction γ of the bid (i.e., T = γ B), where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.  Thus, U = ∆P + γB. 
We assume U2 ≠ 0 but reinstate the assumption that states do not subsidize the bid (i.e. S = 0).  In 
this case, the mayor raises her bid to the point that makes her indifferent between having the plant and not 
having the plant. If all the mayors behave in the same way, the mayor’s optimal bid is 
(3)  B* = V0 / (1-γ) 
In this case, the mayor overbids, by choosing B* which is larger than the value of the plant to the 
residents.  Such overbidding causes land values in the winning county to decline relative to the losing 
county.  The magnitude of the decline depends on the mayor’s weight on her own welfare: ∆P= - (γ / (1-
γ)) V0  ≤ 0. 
Case 4.  When U2 ≠ 0 and there is a positive state subsidy (i.e., Sij>0), the change in land prices 
cannot be signed.  The state subsidy increases land values, as shown above in case 2, but the inclusion of 
the mayor’s personal gain in the objective function results in a decrease in land values as in Case 3.  
Depending on the magnitude of these two effects, land values may increase or decrease in the winner 
relative to the loser.
16 
2. Heterogeneous Counties.  Although the key assumption in our empirical analysis is that the 
winner and loser counties are homogeneous, it is important to understand the consequences if this 
                                                            
16 In this case, The optimal bid is B* = (V0 + Smax-1 )/ (1-γ). The change in land prices is ∆P= - (γ / (1-γ)) 
V0 + Smax – (1/(1-γ)) Smax-1. 
  12 assumption is not valid.  Here, we allow for heterogeneity in counties’ valuations of attracting the plant, 
V, and plants’ valuations of counties, Z.  In section I-B, we have used the BMW example to argue that 
these two sources of unobserved heterogeneity would confound the effects of the plant opening with the 
differences across counties. Specifically, in that section we argued that a naive estimator that ignores the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity would probably be biased. Here we make the same point more 
formally. This subsection underscores the importance of our identifying assumption.  
For simplicity, we retain the assumptions that Sij = 0 and U2 = 0. If V and Z vary across counties, 
the firm chooses where to locate based not only on the bid B, but also on Z.  Specifically, the value for 
firm j of choosing county i is Bij+Zij.  Assume for simplicity that there are only two levels of V, high V 
(VH) and low V (VL); and two levels of Z, high Z (ZH) and low Z, (ZL).  Consider first the case where V 
and Z are positively correlated, so that the county with high V also has high Z.  Thus, one county will 
gain the most from attracting firm j and is also the least cost production location for firm j.  Its optimal 
bid is such that the county with low Z and low V is indifferent between having the plant and not having 
the plant: 
(4)  B* = VL - (ZH – ZL) 
In this case, the county that is the best match enjoys a rent that is capitalized into land values. 
Land values increase by an amount proportional to the difference in V and the difference in Z: ∆P = (VH - 
VL) + (ZH  - ZL) >0.  Importantly, the increase in land values is due to the underlying differences in V and 
Z, not the presence of the new plant. 
Consider now the case where V and Z are negatively correlated. County 1 has high V and low Z; 
while county 2 has high Z and low V. If VH+ZL > VL + ZH, county 1 wins the plant by bidding an amount 
B* that makes county 2 indifferent between having the plant and not having the plant: 
(5)   B* = VL + (ZH - ZL) 
The winner county enjoys a rent that is capitalized in land values, although the rent is lower than the rent 
in the case of positive correlation between Z and V: ∆P = (VH - VL) - (ZH  - ZL) >0. A similar conclusion 
applies if VH+ZL < VL + ZH. In this case county 2 is the winner and its land prices increase by ∆P = (ZH  - 
ZL) - (VH - VL) >0.  Again, the heterogeneity is the source of the change in prices.
17  The implications for 





                                                            
17 In the unlikely case that VH+ZL = VL + ZH, the two counties are equivalent, and the winner is randomly 
determined.  
  13 III. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
A. Data Sources 
We implement the design using data on winner and loser counties.  Each issue of the corporate 
real estate journal Site Selection includes an article titled the “Million Dollar Plants” that describes how a 
large plant decided where to locate.
18  These articles always report the county that the plant chose (i.e., the 
‘winner’), and usually report the runner-up county or counties (i.e., the “losers”).
19  As the BMW case 
study indicated the winner and losers are usually chosen from an initial sample of “semi-finalist” sites that 
in many cases numbers in the hundreds.
20 The articles tend to focus on large plants, and our impression is 
that they provide a representative sample of all new large plant openings in the US.  The articles usually indicate 
the plant’s output, which we use to assign the plant to the relevant 1-digit industry.   
These data have two important limitations.  First, the magnitude of the subsidy offered by the 
winner counties is in many cases unobserved and the bid is almost always unobserved for losing counties.  
This is unfortunate, because an interesting check of the validity of our research design would be to test 
whether the subsidies offered are equal in the winning and losing counties.  Second, in many cases the 
articles do not report the expected size of the plant.  
  In order to conduct the analysis, we collected the most detailed and comprehensive county-level 
data available on employment, government finances, and property values available for the period from 
1970 through 1999.  The employment data comes from the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns 
(CBP) data file.  These annual data report the number of employees and the total wage bill at the county 
by industry level.  In order to protect the confidentiality of the respondents, these data are “zeroed out” for 
many industry by county cells.  Consequently, we conduct our analysis at the 1-digit industry by county 
level.
21  The CBP data are used to test whether a plant opening is associated with changes in wage bill 
trends in its industry, as well as other industries. We focus on the total wage bill rather than total 
employment since the latter cannot detect changes in the skill content of labor. Unfortunately, the CBP 
does not report hourly wages. 
                                                            
18 In 1985, the journal Industrial Development changed its name to Site Selection.  Henceforth, we refer to 
it as Site Selection.  Also, in some years the feature “Million Dollar Plants” was titled “Location Reports.” 
19 In some instances the “Million Dollar Plants” articles do not identify the runner-up county.  For these 
cases, we did a Lexis/Nexis search for other articles discussing the plant opening and in 4 cases were able 
to identify the loser counties.  The Lexis/Nexis searches were also used to identify the plant’s industry 
when this was unavailable in Site Selection. 
20 The names of the semi-finalists are rarely reported. 
21 For the purposes of the analysis, we divide output into the 5 broad “1-digit” industries defined by the 
CBP  for which uncensored wage bill data are available in most years.  These industries are: 
Manufacturing; Transportation and Public Utilities; Trade (Wholesale plus Retail); Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate; Services.  At this level of aggregation, 17% of the cells are “zeroed” out.   
  14   We also test whether the successful attraction of a plant affects property values.  We are unaware 
of any existing electronic files of annual county-level property value data, so we created our own county 
by year data file on property values from two sources.  First, we contacted all the state and county 
governments in our winner and loser samples directly and requested all their historical data on property 
values.
22  These data exist because governments determine the value of property in their jurisdictions for 
the purpose of assessing property taxes.  Second, we supplemented these data by hand entering data from 
the 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 Census of Governments, Volume 2 Taxable Property Values and 
Assessment-Sales Price Ratios.  The censuses reports market values in the year before each census was 
conducted.  In years where data was unavailable from both sources, we estimated county-level property 
values by linearly interpolating the Census of Government data.  The property value data are missing for 
some counties. Our preferred property value sample is comprised of 30 of the 82 winners and 62 of the 
129 losers.  See the Data Appendix for a further discussion of these data. 
 The  Annual Survey of Governments: Finance Statistics Series (ASG) is used to determine the 
fiscal consequences for local governments of new plant openings.  The ASG is an annual survey of 
governments that asks detailed questions on governments’ expenditures by function (e.g., education, 
administration, and public assistance) and type (i.e., intergovernmental transactions, current operations, 
and capital outlays).  The data also contains information on revenues by source, indebtedness, and cash 
and securities holdings. We aggregate these data to the county level.  This aggregation is done on the 
sample of governmental units that are surveyed continuously from 1970 through 1999 so that the units are 
held fixed.  In our “Million Dollar Plant” sample of 166 winner and loser counties, 150 counties have at 
least one governmental unit that reports continuously.  The continuous reporters comprise only 12.5% of 
all governmental units in these counties but account for approximately 75% of revenues and expenditures.  
This is because large government units are sampled with certainty, while smaller units are sampled with 






                                                            
22 We attempted to get this data for the primary sample of 166 counties dating back to the early 1970s.  
We collected at least 1 year of property value data from 153 counties.  In general, these governments did 
not have data from the earlier years.  For example, we have nonmissing property value date for 68 
counties in 1977, 102 in 1980, 149 in 1990, and 153 in 1998. 
23 According to the data documentation, the following governments are sampled with certainty: “all 
county governments with a population of 50,000 or more, municipal governments with a population of 
25,000 or more; township government in the New England and Middle Atlantic states with a population 
  15 B. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the sample of plant location decisions that form the basis 
of the analysis.  The first panel indicates that in our primary sample there are 82 separate plant openings 
and an average of 1.6 losers per winner or a total of 129 losers.  There are 166 counties in this sample, so 
the average county appears roughly 1.3 times.
24 The second panel reports the distribution of the number 
of losers per winner.  We refer to the winner and accompanying loser(s) associated with each plant 
opening as a “case.”   In 57 of the 82 cases there is a single loser and in 14 there are 2 losers.  The table 
also reveals that 63 of the 82 plants were in the manufacturing industry.  Thus, our analysis is most 
informative about the consequences of attracting industrial plants.  The final panel lists the distribution of 
the year of the announcement about the plant opening.  22 of the plant openings were in 1991 and 1992.  
Appendix Table 2 reports the identity of each plant, its industry, and the winner and loser counties.     
Although we do not know the determinants of the counties’ valuations of plants (i.e., Vij) or the 
plants’ valuations of counties (i.e., Zij), Table 2 presents the means across counties of some likely 
determinants of these variables in the three years before the announcement of the plant opening.  These 
means are reported for winners, losers, and the entire U.S. in columns (1), (2), and (4), respectively.
25  
Column (3) presents the t-statistic and p-value from the test that the entries in (1) and (2) are equal. We 
expect that winner and loser counties are similar so that any differences in columns (1) and (2) will be 
small.  In contrast, we expect that a comparison of the winners (or losers) with all U.S. counties is likely 
to produce larger differences.  
The first panel reports the means of three outcome variables in the three years before the 
announcement of the plant opening.  The total wage bill in the new plant’s industry is approximately 
$1,127 million in winner counties, compared to $1,145 million in loser counties.   This difference is not 
statistically meaningful and indicates that there were similar levels of activity in the two sets of counties.  
The count of full-time employees leads to the same conclusion.  The third row of this panel indicates that 
the hypothesis of equivalent aggregate property values across winning and losing counties cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance levels.  Overall, this panel demonstrates that for these outcome 
measures, the winners and losers are quite similar and suggests that our research design may be valid. In 
contrast, the corresponding figures for all the US counties are much smaller. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of 25,000 or more; school districts with an enrollment of 5,000 or more; and special districts with long-
term debt outstanding of $10 million, or total revenue or expenditure of $5 million.” 
24 127 counties appear once in the data.  33 counties appear twice and 6 counties are present three times. 
Through the entire empirical analysis, we exclude 7 counties whose population is larger than 2 million, 
because the impact of a plant opening would be difficult to detect is such large counties.   
25 The loser entries in column 2 are calculated in the following manner.  First, we calculate the mean 
across all the losers for a given case.  Second, we calculate the overall loser average as the unweighted 
mean across all cases so that each case is given equal weight. 
  16 The second and third panel report mean levels and changes of socioeconomic and demographic 
variables.  In general, the null hypothesis of equal means in winner and loser counties cannot be rejected 
with conventional criteria.  Notably, this is true both for the levels of the variables in the 3 years 
preceding the plant opening and the percent growth in those years.  For the two variables (i.e., per capita 
income and fraction with a BA or higher) where the p-value is .05 or less, the losers’ mean is closer to the 
winners’ mean than is the mean across all U.S. counties in column (4).  Interestingly, there are important 
differences between all U.S. counties and the winner counties.  In particular, the winner counties are 
richer, have a substantially larger population, a higher employment-population ratio, a better educated 
population, and fewer people over the age of 65.     
The fourth and fifth panels show the geographic distribution of plants across the four regions of 
the U.S. and the industry distribution of the labor force within the categories.  Here, the means across the 
winner and loser counties are not well balanced.  For example, 66% of the winner counties are in the 
South compared to 39% of the losers.  This suggests that there may be unobserved differences (e.g., union 
density) across the winner and loser counties.   
However, it is important to realize that our empirical analysis in not based on a cross sectional 
comparison of winners and losers. Instead, the basis of our empirical strategy is comparisons of changes 
in outcomes between winners and losers. Cross-sectional differences will only invalidate the design if 
levels of these variables determine future changes.  As the next section discusses, we use regression 
adjustment to mitigate the probability of this type of misspecification.  For example, we estimate 
specifications that include region by year fixed effects.  Moreover, the finding in the third panel that the 
growth rates in income, earnings and employment-population ratio are similar in winner and loser 
counties is reassuring in this respect.  
Overall, Table 2 reveals remarkable similarities between the winner and loser counties.  Further, 
there are substantial differences between the average U.S. county and the winner and loser counties.  This 
suggests that our pairwise comparisons are more likely to produce unbiased estimates of the consequences 
of attracting a plant than comparisons of the winner counties to the entire US.  
 
IV. Econometric Model 
In light of the firm’s selection rule, the goal is to estimate the causal effect of winning a plant on 
county-level outcomes.  This section discusses the 2-step econometric model used to estimate this effect.  
In the first step, we fit the following equation:       














where i references industry, j indicates a case, c denotes county, and t indexes year.  τ also denotes year, 
but it is normalized so that the year a plant opening is announced is τ = 0.
26  In equation (6) Yijct is total 
wages.  In (6’) Yjct is a county-level measure of property values or a government finance variable.  ξijct and 
ξjct are the respective stochastic error terms. 
αic ( αc) is a full set of industry x county (county) fixed effects that adjust for permanent 
differences in the intercept of the outcome variables.  These account for all fixed county characteristics.  
µit (µt) is a vector of indicators that nonparametrically controls for industry x year (year) effects.  In some 
specifications the sample includes the entire U.S., while in others we restrict it to our “Million Dollar 
Plant” sample of 166 counties.  The use of the smaller sample is equivalent to imposing the restriction 
that the industry x year (year) effects are the same in the 166 counties and the remainder of the country.  
ηijτ (ηjτ) is a set of separate fixed effects for each of the cases interacted with an indicator for whether τ 
>= -8 and τ <= 5.  We restrict attention to these values of τ, because the sample is balanced over this 
range.   
The vectors πWτ and πLτ are the parameters of interest in these equations.  They measure the 
period-specific means of the dependent variables in winner and loser counties, respectively, where the 
means are conditional on all the indicator variables described in the previous paragraph.  The period is 
determined by the years since (or until) the plant opening.   
A few details about the identification of the π’s bear highlighting.  First, and most importantly, 
the case fixed effects (i.e., ηijτ and ηjτ) guarantee that the π’s are identified from comparisons within a 
winner-loser pair for τ >= -8 and τ <= 5 and are a way to retain the intuitive appeal of pairwise 
differencing in a regression framework.  Second, it is possible to separately identify the π’s and the 
industry x year (year) effects because the plant openings occurred in multiple years.  Third, a single 
observation from counties that are winners and/or losers multiple times simultaneously helps to identify 
multiple π’s.  Fourth, the specification does not control for time-varying covariates, such as the variables 
listed in Table 2.  This is because many, if not all, of these variables (e.g., per capita income and 
population) may be affected by the plant opening so are likely endogenous. 
Table 2 suggested that there might be important unmeasured region-specific determinants of the 
outcome variables (e.g., differences in union density).  Since the analysis is at the industry x county level 
                                                            
26 The date when the plant begins production is unknown, so we use the year of the announcement of the 
winner county as τ = 0. In most cases, the construction of the new plant starts immediately after the 
announcement. 
  18 in (6) and county level in (6’), it is possible to include region x time fixed effects in order to 
nonparametrically adjust for all unobservables that vary across regions over time.  As a test of robustness, 
we present results from specifications that include these fixed effects. 
The 2
nd step provides a method to summarize the π’s to infer the effect of attracting a plant.  To 
implement this step, we stack the π’s into a 28 x 1 vector.  This vector is the dependent variable in the 
following equation: 
(7)   πSτ =    θ + δ 1(Winner) + ψ trend + λ (trend * 1(Winner)) 
+ γ (trend * 1(τ >= 0)) 
+ β (trend * 1(Winner) * 1(τ >= 0)) + υSτ, 
where S indexes winner status and τ remains the year relative to the plant opening.  This equation allows 
for a differential intercept for the winner parameters.  It also includes a common time trend, ψ.  The 
parameter λ measures whether the time trend differs for winners, while γ captures whether the trend 
differs after the announcement of the plant opening (i.e., when τ >= 0).
 27 
28   
β is the parameter of interest.  It measures the difference in the time trend specific to winners 
(relative to losers) after the announcement of the plant’s opening (relative to before the announcement).  
Formally, the consistency of this parameter requires the assumption that cov[(trend * 1(Winner) * 1(τ >= 
0)), υWτ] = 0 be valid.  Recall from Section II-B that we assume that plants choose a site based on the sum 
of Bij and Zij.  It is likely that these same unobserved variables predict the outcome variables in (6) and 
(6’).  Therefore, the identifying assumption is that the industry by county fixed effects, industry by year 
fixed effects, case fixed effects, region by year fixed effects and the detrending by winner status and τ >= 
0 fully condition out Bij and Zij. 
It is interesting to note that if this assumption is not valid, the bias cannot be signed a priori.  This 
is because the sign of the bias depends on whether cov(Bij,υWτ) + cov(Zij,υWτ) is < 0 or > 0.  One can think 
of cases where the sum is positive and cases where it is negative. For example, it is possible that 
cov(Bij,υWτ) < 0 if  counties with “bad” outcomes (i.e., lower wage bill or lower land prices) are the ones 
that have the most to gain by attracting a new plant.  At the same time, it is plausible that cov(Zij,υWτ) > 0, 
                                                            
27 We include the winner fixed effect in (7), because (6) and (6’) include all periods (i.e., from –19<= τ 
<=17), while the second step only uses observations where –8<= τ <=5.  For this reason, the winner fixed 
effect in (7) is not collinear with the county by industry (county) fixed effects (6) and (6’).  We also 
experimented with models that include the interaction of winner status and a dummy equal one if τ >= 0 
to allow for a mean shift in addition to the trend break.  The basic results are unchanged.  
28 Since the estimated π’s for winners (losers) are obtained from a balanced panel, their standard errors 
are virtually identical.  Consequently, the fact that the π’s are estimated is unlikely to be a source of 
heteroskedasticity in the estimation of equation (7).  Regardless, the subsequent results are insensitive to 
weighting by the square root of the inverse of the standard errors of the π’s from equation (6).  
  19 since counties with characteristics that firms find desirable may also have “good” outcomes (i.e., higher 
wage bill or higher land prices).  
 
V. Results 
  This section is divided into three subsections.  The first reports the estimates of winner status on 
workers’ earnings within the winning county and its surrounding counties.  Separate results are reported 
for the new plant’s 1-digit industry and for all other industries.  The second subsection reports the 
association between winner status and property values.  According to the model in Section II, property 
values may provide a measure of overall welfare.  The third subsection examines the association between 
winner status and a series of local government revenue and expenditures categories.     
 
A. Employment Outcomes 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the estimated πWτ’s and πLτ’s and their standard errors from 
the fitting of equation (6) on total wage bill data from the CBP for all counties from 1970-1998.  Recall, τ 
is normalized so that τ = 0 is the year that the plant location decision is announced.  Each row reports the 
estimated πW’s and πL’s for a given value of τ.  Consequently, the point estimates are annual measures of 
the total wage bill in millions of dollars by winner/loser status in the 1-digit industry of the new plant for 
5 => τ >= -8.  These estimates are conditioned on county by industry, industry by time, and case fixed 
effects.  Column (3) reports the difference between the estimates of πWτ and πLτ within each row. 
  The top panel of Figure 1 separately plots the estimates of πWτ and πLτ against τ.
29  The bottom 
panel of Figure 1 plots the difference in the estimated πWτ and πLτ against τ and is a graphical version of 
column (3) of Table 3.  From these graphs, it is evident that in the 1-digit industry of the new plant, the 
winning and losing counties have almost identical trends from τ = -8 through τ = -1.  A statistical test 
confirms that the trends in the wage bill in the winner and loser counties are statistically indistinguishable 
in the 8 years before the opening of the plant. (The t-statistics is 0.37.)  Importantly, this is consistent with 
our identifying assumption that loser counties provide a valid counterfactual.    
However beginning with the year that the plant opening is announced, there is a sharp increase in 
the trend in the wage bill in the 1-digit industry of the new plant in the winning counties.  In contrast, the 
losing counties’ trend is largely unchanged.  The figure also demonstrates that it is appropriate to model 
the effect of the plant opening with a trend-break, rather than the more typical difference in differences 
mean shift. 
                                                            
29 In order to get the lines on the same scale, the winner’s line is shifted up so that the difference between 
the lines is 0 when τ = -1. This same normalization is used in all the subsequent figures.   
  20   Table 4 reports estimates of β and its standard error that result from fitting equation (7).  In 
column (1) (a), the πWτ’s and πLτ’s used to obtain these estimates are those that were presented in Table 3 
and the top panel of Figure 1.  In column (1) (b) region by year fixed effects are included in equation (6), 
so the πWτ’s and πLτ’s are adjusted for all time varying region-specific factors.  The results in this column 
are intended as a robustness check and throughout the remainder of this table, as well as Tables 5 and 6, 
(a) and (b) refer to the estimation of equation (6), or (6’), with and without region by year fixed effects, 
respectively.
 30   
The column (1) parameter estimates suggest that in the new plant’s 1-digit industry, the trend in 
the wage bill increased by a statistically significant $16.7-16.8 million in winning counties (relative to 
losing ones) after the announcement of the plant’s opening (relative to the period before the 
announcement).  This is 1.5% of the average wage bill in winner counties in the year τ = -1.
31  Taken 
literally, this implies that by the end of the period (i.e., τ = 5) the wage bill in the new plant’s 1-digit 
industry is roughly $100 million (9%) higher due to the plant opening than predicted by pre-existing 
trends.  Interestingly, the point estimate is unchanged by the inclusion of the region by year fixed effects.   
Column (2) reports the results when the estimated π’s are obtained from fitting equation (6) on 
the restricted sample of 166 winner and loser counties (rather than the entire U.S.).  As before, the π’s are 
used to estimate β from equation (7).  The estimates in (a) and (b) suggests that the trend in the wage bill 
increased by $19.7 and $15.9 million, respectively.  In the context of the standard errors, these estimates 
are essentially identical to those in column (1).  Figure 2 presents the column (2) (a) results graphically.  
Column (3) reports a “naïve” estimator that is obtained by using a standard regression to test for a 
trend break in the winner counties after the announcement relative to before. It is labeled “naïve” because 
the losers are not used as a counterfactual (so it is not conditioned on case fixed effects).  It is estimated 
on data from the entire U.S. as in column (1).  Interestingly, the point estimates here are larger than those 
in (1).  This indicates that the wage bill in the new plant’s 1-digit industry was growing faster in the loser 
counties than in the rest of the country.  This is consistent with the notion that the expected future average 
costs of production are lower in the winner and loser counties than in the remainder of the country.   
  Column (1) of Table 5 and Figure 3 test whether the opening of the new plant is associated with 
changes in employment in other industries in the winning county.  The point estimates suggest that the 
trend in the wage bill increased by $35.0-46.7 million, which is approximately 0.9-1.3% of the τ = -1 
                                                            
30 In all the figures, specification (a), which does not include region by year fixed effects, is used to obtain 
the πWτ’s and πLτ’s.   
31 In the column (1) (a) specification when the dependent variable is the ln of the total wage bill, the 
parameter estimate and standard error are 0.0079 (0.0037). 
  21 level.  However, these estimates are imprecise, and would not be judged statistically significant by 
conventional criteria.   
The remainder of Table 5 and Figures 4 and 5 examines whether the successful attraction of the 
new plant affects the trend in the wage bill in counties that neighbor the winner.  Here, a neighbor is 
defined as a county that physically abuts a county or is connected by a bridge or boat.  We compare the 
neighbors of winners to the neighbors of losers.  In Figure 4, there appears to be a trend break in the total 
wage bill in the same 1-digit as the new plant.  The estimates in column 2 confirm this.  They suggest that 
the post-announcement trend increased by $32.4-33.8 million, or approximately 1.1%.   This estimate 
borders on statistical significance as judged by conventional criteria. Figure 5 plots the results for all other 
1-digit industries from the (a) specification.  The bottom panel reveals that the relative downward trend 
before the announcement of the plant opening in winner counties is halted, but the data are noisy.  This is 
reflected in the large point estimate ($60.7-90.9 million) and standard errors in column (3) of Table 5.   
One interpretation of this last set of results is that the gains in the winning counties are not the 
result of losses in their neighbors.  That is, the effect of the plant opening is not zero sum locally.
32 
However, the precision of the estimates in Table 5 precludes definitive conclusions.
33   
As we mentioned, we focus on the total wage bill rather than total employment since the latter 
cannot detect changes in the skill content of labor.  However, the employment results are generally similar 
to the wage bill ones. For example, Appendix Figure 1 presents graphs that are analogous to Figure 2 for 
total employment, rather than the total wage bill. 
 
B. Property Values 
  Here, we assess whether winner status is associated with changes in property values.  Recall, 
property values may provide a summary measure of welfare.  In a model with rational, perfect-foresight 
agents, the net effect of winning the plant should be capitalized into property values immediately after the 
announcement.  In this case, it would be appropriate to test for an immediate mean shift in property 
values.  As the Data Appendix describes, property values are only reappraised every few years in many 
states, so that changes in property values will emerges only gradually in our sample. Consequently, we 
continue to use the trend break model specified in equation (7).   
                                                            
32 We also explored whether there are effects on the wage bill at the state level.  The point estimates are 
large and positive but the standard errors are so large that they have little empirical content. 
33 As a test of robustness, we included a full set of state by year fixed effects in equation (6) in order to 
control for all time-varying state factors.  In this case, the estimated trend breaks are generally of a larger 
magnitude across all the dependent variables in Tables 4 and 5.  This implies that the winner counties and 
their neighbors experienced even larger gains in total wage bill than suggested in the tables and the text.   
  22 The property value results are presented in Table 6 and Figure 6.  In columns (1) and (2) of Table 
6, the sample is limited to the “Million Dollar Plant” counties with nonmissing property value data for –8 
<= τ <= 5. This sample includes 32 of the 82 winners and 69 of the 129 losers.  Column (3) adds the 
sample restriction that all observations from California are dropped, which reduces the sample by 2 
winners and 7 losers.  This restriction is imposed, because Propoistion 13 restricts annual increases in 
property values in California to 2% annually.
34  This is the preferred sample. 
In column (1) of Table 6, the point estimates imply that the trend in the property values increased 
by $103-140 million in winning counties (relative to losing ones) after the announcement of the plant’s 
opening (relative to the period before the announcement).  These estimates would not be judged to be 
statistically different than zero by conventional criteria.  Nevertheless, this is approximately 0.6-0.8% of 
the average property value in winner counties at τ = -1.  The column (2) specifications add California by 
year fixed effects to (6’) in order to account for the effect of Proposition 13.  These estimates are 
modestly larger than those in column (1) but overall indicate a similar conclusion. 
Figure 6 is based on the preferred sample that excludes California counties.  This figure shows 
that the two sets of counties had remarkably similar trends in aggregate property values prior to the 
announcement of the plant opening.  This result is similar to the findings for the wage bill in Figure 1 and 
2, and supports the validity of our identifying assumption.  Figure 6 also reveals a dramatic upward trend 
break in property values in winner counties that coincides with the announcement of the plant opening.   
The corresponding point estimates in column (3) of Table 6 indicate that the trend break in 
winning counties ranges from $176-278 million. Conventional criteria would judge these estimates to be 
statistically different from zero.
35  They are approximately 1.1-1.7% of the τ = -1 property values in 
winner counties.  This suggests that by the end of the examined period (i.e., 6 years after τ = -1), property 
values in winner counties had increased by 6.6-10.2%, relative to loser counties.  To put this in context, 
the mean six-year change in property values in the years before the opening is 47.7%.
36  Taken together, 
the estimates in Table 6 fail to provide evidence that the successful attraction of a big plant reduces 
property values.
37  These findings are broadly consistent with previous research that estimates the effect 
of increased economic activity on land values.
38 
                                                            
34 See the Data Appendix for a further discussion of the difficulties with California data. 
35 It is uncertain whether the point estimates would be statistically significant if the standard errors were 
corrected for the linear interpolation procedure. 
36 The point estimate (standard error) on the 1-digit wage bill is 15.0 (13.6) for this sample with 
specification (a).   
37 We also estimated (6’) with a full set of state by year fixed effects.  This is very demanding of the 
property value data, because they contain observations from 29 states but only 92 counties.  Further, only 
17 of these states have multiple counties in our sample.  Nevertheless, this produces negative trend breaks 
with standard errors that are approximately twice as large as those in Table 6.  None of the point estimates 
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C. Local Government Finance Outcomes 
  A popular concern about the provision of these subsidies is that local governments fund them 
with cuts in important services, such as education and police protection.  Table 7 empirically explores this 
issue.  For a series of local government finance variables, column (1) reports the estimated β and standard 
error from equation (7).  In this table, the π’s that are used as the dependent variables in (7) are obtained 
from the estimation of equation (6’) on the sample of 150 “Million Dollar Plant” counties that have at 
least one governmental unit reporting consecutively from 1970 through 1999.  The region by year fixed 
effects are not included in this version of (6’).  Column (2) reports the mean of the budget variables in 
winning counties at τ = -1 and column (3) lists the ratio of the point estimate in column (1) to this mean.  
The table is divided into separate panels for expenditures, revenues, and indebtedness and within 
these broad categories separate results for subcategories are reported.  In viewing these results, it is 
important to bear in mind that according to the ASG data the trend in population increased by 
approximately 0.8% in winning counties after the announcement.  Thus, these counties were gaining 
residents.   
  The first panel reports the expenditure results.  The “Total” row suggests that the trend in total 
expenditures increased by $17.2 million or 1.8% of the τ = -1 mean.  The category can be divided into 
current expenditures, capital outlays, and payments to other governmental units.  In percentage terms, the 
increase was roughly equivalent in the current and capital categories.   
The “selected sub-categories” results reveal where the extra money was targeted.  The trend break 
in capital education expenditures was 4.8% of the τ = -1 mean and this accounted for roughly 55% of the 
increase in capital expenditures.  This finding and the current education expenditure results suggests that 
spending per pupil may have increased, although this calculation is speculative and requires a number of 
assumptions to be valid.
39  Interestingly, the trend break in housing and community development 
expenditures was larger than the overall trend break in expenditures.  The increase in spending on 
publicly operated utilities is consistent with the expansion of the manufacturing sector.  Notably, the 
results suggest that spending on police protection was unchanged but on a per capita basis it declined 
modestly.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would be judged to be statistically significant by conventional criteria.  We suspect that this model is 
“overparameterized.”   
38 See Chapter 5 of Bartik (1991) for a review.  Also see Dye and Merriman (2000) for the effects of tax 
incremental financing schemes that fund economic development projects on property values.   
39 For example, the ASG population variable is a measure of all residents.  It is not possible to separately 
determine the number of students in public schools.   
  24 The second panel reveals that the trend in revenues increased by $18.5 million.  Approximately 
1/3 of this increase was due to higher transfers from state governments, underscoring that states are an 
important source for the subsidies used to attract new plants.  The results also reveal trend breaks in local 
tax revenues and utility charges of roughly $4 million.  The larger trend break on utility expenditures 
compared to the charges trend break implies that the new plants may receive discounts on utility fees. 
A comparison of the first and second panels reveals that the trend break in expenditures is 
roughly equal to the trend break in revenues.  This is to be expected since local governments are generally 
required to balance their budgets annually.  It is notable though that the balance was not achieved through 
cutbacks in valuable public services. 
In light of this finding, it is initially surprising that the trend in long-term debt increased by $16.3 
million.  The final entry in the table demonstrates that this is largely explained by the $12.8 million trend 
break in nonguaranteed debt, which is a form of debt that is not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of 
the government.  This type of debt is generally issued under the authority of a government body to gain 
tax-exempt status, but it is used for private purposes and the government generally does not have any 
obligation to repay it.
40  It seems sensible to conclude that this is one of the types of incentives given to 
the new plants. 
 
VI. Interpretation 
        The results suggest that the successful attraction of a ‘Million Dollar’ plant is on average 
associated with an increase in property values (and welfare).  If our identifying assumption that winner 
and loser counties are ex-ante homogeneous is valid, the model in Section II indicates that the effect of 
state subsidies dominates any malfeasance by politicians.  The implication of this interpretation is that the 
increase in winner counties’ property values is due to the transfer of resources from state to winner 
counties.   It is possible, however, that the new plant affects property values in the neighbors of winners 
(recall the wage bill results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 5) and/or the entire state.  Since property 
value data on the neighbors of winners and entire states is unavailable, we cannot test this possibility.  If 
this possibility has no empirical basis, then we speculate that winner counties gain at the expense of the 
rest of the state. 
  An alternative interpretation of the property value results is that our identifying assumption is 
invalid and winner and loser counties are not ex-ante homogeneous.  If this is the case, the findings may 
reflect the combined effect of unobserved heterogeneity in counties’ valuations of plants and plants’ 
                                                            
40 According to the ASG manual, this type of bond has been used to fund industrial and commercial 
development, pollution control, private hospital facilities, sports stadiums, and shopping malls (Census 
1999, Section 9.3).   
  25 valuations of counties (the terms V and Z in Section II), rather than the effect of the plant opening. 
However, the similarity of the pre-announcement trends in the wage bill and property values in winner 
and loser counties, the ex-ante similarity of observable characteristics of winner and loser counties, and 
the robustness of our results to the inclusion of region-year effects suggest that our research design is 
valid. 
Of course, the link between property values and residents' welfare rests crucially on the validity 
of the Roback model's assumptions (see Section II).  If these assumptions do not hold, the welfare 
interpretation no longer applies.  However, our results will still paint a detailed portrait of the impact of 
successfully bidding for a large industrial plant on workers' earnings, property values and government 
finances.  It is widely believed that all three of these outcomes are important measures of a policy's 
efficacy and local economic health. 
One shortcoming of the analysis is that it is unable to determine the importance of the different 
potential forms of heterogeneity.  For example, we cannot ascertain whether the increase in employment 
is simply due to increases in demand, agglomeration economies, or other type of externalities.  In future 
work, we will use this same research design to test the agglomeration theory by exploring whether the 
opening of a “Million Dollar Plant” lowers the production costs of other plants in the same industry in 
winning counties.   
Another limitation of this study is that its external validity is unknown.  In particular, the 82 
plants in our sample likely differ from the average industrial plant in many important dimensions so we 
suspect that these results do not necessarily generalize to the opening of any plant.  The most important 
dimension in which the “Million Dollar” plants differ from the average plant is in their size.  Although we 
do not know the exact selection rule that determines which plants are featured in the “Million Dollar 
Plant” articles, it is quite clear that very large plants are the focus. We suspect that the 82 plants in our 
sample are a reasonably representative sample of all new large plant openings in the US.  Since large 
plants are the ones that spur bidding by local governments, the paper’s estimates are likely to be 
informative about the consequences of attracting the type of plants that receive large subsidies. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper makes two contributions. Substantively, it provides credible estimates of the effect of 
winning large industrial plants on local economies. We find that the opening of a “Million Dollar” plant is 
associated with a 1.5% increase in the trend in earnings in the new plant’s industry in winning counties 
(relative to losing ones) after the opening of the plant (relative to the period before the opening). We also 
find evidence of positive trend breaks in total wages in other industries in the same county and in 
neighboring counties, although these estimates are less precise.  This result is important in itself, because 
  26 it provides credible estimates of the increase in local economic activity directly and indirectly due to the 
new plant. 
When we turn to property values, the most reliable data suggest that there is a relative trend break 
of approximately 1.1-1.7% in property values in winning counties. If property values provide a summary 
measure of the net change in welfare, this result undermines the popular view that the provision of local 
subsidies to attract large industrial plants reduces residents’ welfare. 
 The analysis further reveals that local government finances in winning counties are not adversely 
affected by the successful bidding for a plant.  Local governments in winner counties experienced positive 
and roughly equal trend breaks in revenues and expenditures.  Notably, there is a substantial increase in 
education spending.   
The second contribution of the paper is methodological.  The paper demonstrates that it is 
possible to use the revealed rankings of profit-maximizing agents to identify a credible counterfactual.  In 
our particular case, we show that loser counties—counties that have survived a long selection process, but 
narrowly lost the competition—may form a valid counterfactual for what would have happened in the 
absence of the plant opening in winner counties.  The same methodology may be useful in other contexts 
(e.g., auctions) to make causal inferences.  
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DATA APPENDIX: Property Value Data 
  There are a number of issues about the property value data that may affect the interpretation of 
the paper’s results.  First, the linear interpolation procedure causes the true variability in the data to be 
understated and biases the standard errors in the regressions downwards.  Further, it may obscure the 
timing of changes in property values associated with plant openings.   
Second, the data measure the aggregate market value of all land and structures across residential 
and industrial land.
41  In many states, the assessed value differs from the market value but, in these cases, 
an assessment rate is available that allows for the conversion to market values.  It was not possible to 
obtain separate measures of the value of the land, excluding the structures, for our entire sample.  A 
drawback of this measure of property values is that it will include the value of the new plant’s structure, 
which mechanically causes measured property values to increase.  We were unable to obtain reliable 
measures of the size of these plants but we note that the mean aggregate property values in winner 
counties in the year before the plant opening is roughly $17.1 billion.  Consequently, we suspect that the 
plant’s structure is unlikely to have substantive effect on aggregate property values.   
Third, there are important differences across states in the statutes that govern assessments.  One 
important difference is that the frequency of appraisals varies dramatically across states.   Appendix Table 
1 reports the distribution of state mandated property assessment cycles for the 31 states represented in the 
preferred property value sample.  14, or almost half of the states, require that all properties are reassessed 
or revalued every year, but 12 states reassess less frequently than once every 3 years.   Interestingly, 
Connecticut allows 10 years between revaluations.  In many of the states that allow for more than a year 
between reappraisals, 1/x of the properties are reassessed each year, where x is the number of years 
between mandated revaluations.   
The relevance for our analysis is that these data are not designed to give accurate measures of 
property values each year.  This is relevant because a model with rational, perfect-foresight agents would 
predict that the net effect of winning the plant should be capitalized into property values immediately 
after the announcement.  Thus, it would be appropriate to estimate this effect with a 1-time change in 
mean property values.  In light of the infrequent reappraisals in many states, a trend break model is more 
appropriate and this model is discussed further in the econometrics section.   
A related issue is that since the reappraisal dates are unobserved, there are likely to be jumps in 
the property value data.  It is possible that these jumps could induce a spurious correlation between a 
plant opening and property values.  Further, the longer the period between reappraisals, the more difficult 
it is to detect changes in property values associated with a plant opening in the first few years after its 
opening.  Consequently, we drop all observations from counties with at least one annual change in 
property values greater than 70% or less than –70%. 
Due to the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, the California data present a set of unique issues.  
Proposition 13 limits the increase in the assessed value of a home to 2% per year, unless there is a transfer 
of ownership or substantial improvements are made.  As a consequence, it is difficult to detect positive 
changes in property values in California.  To the best of our knowledge, no other states place a cap on the 
increase in assessed property values.
42  In our preferred sample, we drop all California counties from the 
sample.  We also demonstrate that the results are robust to including these counties in the sample, with or 
without California by year fixed effects. 
                                                            
41 States have different names for the market value of land.  The most frequently used ones are “fair 
market value”, “full cash value”, or “true cash value”.    
42 Appendix D of the 1992 Census of Governments, Volume 2 Taxable Property Values, Number 1 
Assessed Valuations for Local General Property Taxation lists the state-specific requirements for periodic 
valuation of real property.  According to this Appendix, California is the only state that places a cap on 
the increase in property values.   
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Due to these data challenges, we correlated our measure of property values for counties in MSAs 
with an annual MSA-level produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) in 
order to ascertain its meaningfulness.
43 The OFHEO price index is based on repeated sales of the same 
property. For our purposes, one limitation is that the index is available for metropolitan areas, but not for 
counties, so that the match with our property value data is not perfect. For those observations that we can 
match, the correlation in the annual percentage change is 0.54. 
 
43 The OFHEO price index is available from www.ofheo.gov. Table 1: “The Million Dollar Plant” Sample 
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Number of Observations  
Winners 82 
Losers 129 
    
Distribution of the Number of Loser 








    
Distribution of Cases Across Industries  
Manufacturing 63 
Transportation and Public Utilities  8 
Trade 4 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate  1 
Services 6 
    
Distribution of Year of  














Notes: The “Million Dollar Plant” sample is derived 
from various issues of Site Selection.  See the text 
for more details.   
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Fraction of Population with College Degree  0.197 







Fraction of Pop 17 or Younger  0.257 







Fraction of Pop 65 or Older  0.125 







Trends in Socio-Economic and Demographic Characteristics    

















































































































Notes: The figure in columns 1 and 2 are averages for the three years before the 
plant opening. The figures in the top panel of column 4 are a weighted average 
for years 1982 to 1993, with weights proportional to the number of Million 
Dollar cases in each year and industry. The figures in panels 2 to 5 of column 4 
are a weighted average for years 1982 to 1993, with weights proportional to the 
number of Million Dollar cases in each year (see bottom of Table 1 for the 
distribution of cases across years). All monetary values are in 1983 dollars. 
 Table 3: The Effect of Plant Openings on the Wage Bill, by Year and Winner 















































τ = 0  -39.0 
(159.0) 
203.1            
(118.3) 
-242.1 

























Notes: The Table reports the πWτ (column 1) and πLτ (column 2) coefficients 
and their standard errors from the estimation of equation (6) on the County 
Business Patterns data.  Column (3) reports the difference between the 
column (1) and (2) entries.  See the text for more details.  The same 
coefficients are plotted in the top panel of Figure 1.  Table 4: The Effect of Plant Openings on 1-Digit Industry Wage Bill  
   All US Counties  Winner and Loser Sample  Naïve Estimator 
     






  (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Wage Bill          
Change in Time Trend in Winner 














        
        
        
             
          
Average Wage Bill in  
Winner Counties at τ = -1 
 
1127    
(1498) 
1127    
(1498) 
1127     
(1498) 
1127    
(1498) 
1127    
(1498) 
1127    
(1498) 
Ratio of Row 1 and Row 2 
 
0.015  0.015  0.017  0.014  0.022  0.022 
N 356589 356589 4786 4786 356589 356589
Region by Year Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: The entries in the first row are estimates of β and their heteroskedastic consistent standard errors from 
the fitting of equation (7).  The second row reports the change in trend in one of the loser counties relative to the 
trend in other loser counties. The third row presents the average wage bill in the 1-digit industry of winner 
counties.  Wage bill is measured in millions of dollars.  N refers to the number of observations in the estimation 





 Table 5: The Effect of Plant Openings on Wage Bill – Other Industries and Other Counties 
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Ratio of Row 1 and Row 2 
 
0.009  0.013  0.011  0.011  0.006  0.008 
N 4786 4786 4786 4786 4786 4786
Region  by  Year  Fixed  Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The entries in the first row are estimates of β and their heteroskedastic consistent standard errors from the 
fitting of equation (7).  In column (1), the πWτ’s and πLτ’s are derived from the sample of all industries besides the 
new plant’s industry in the winner and loser counties.  In columns (2) and (3), the πWτ’s and πLτ’s are obtained from 
by fitting equation (6) to observations from counties that neighbor the winner and loser counties for the same industry 
as the new plant and all other industries, respectively.  See the previous tables and the text for more details.   
 
 Table 6: The Effect of Plant Openings on Aggregate Property Values 
     California by Year  
Fixed Effects 
Drop All California 
Observations 
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Ratio of Row 1 and Row 2 
 
0.008  0.006  0.011  0.010  0.017  0.011 
Number of Winners   32  32  32  32  30  30 
Number  of  Losers
 
69 69 69 69 62 62
Region  by  Year  Fixed  Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The entries in the first row are estimates of β and their heteroskedastic consistent standard errors from the 
fitting of equation (7).  The units are millions of dollars.  The property value data was collected from state and local 
governments and from the Census of Governments.  In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes all counties in the 
Million Dollar Plant sample with nonmissing property value data for τ >= -8 and τ <= 5.  The specification in column 
(2) adds California by year fixed effects to the specification.  The sample that underlies the column (3) results adds 
the restriction that all observations from California are dropped.  See the previous tables and the text for more details.  
The Data Appendix contains further details on the housing price data.       Table 7:  The Impact of Winner Status on Government Expenditures, Revenues, and Indebtedness 
Dependent Variables    β  
(std. error) 
(1) 






EXPENDITURES        
Total     17.2 
(4.7) 
966.8 0.018 
 Current      14.5 
(4.3) 
823.5 0.018 
 Capital    2.7 
(2.1) 
143.3 0.019 
 Intergovernmental    1.0 
(0.5) 
35.0 0.029 
   Selected  Sub-Categories    
   Education  (Capital)  1.5 
(0.5) 
31.0 0.048 





   Police  Protection  -0.1 
(0.3) 
50.4 -0.002 





   Utilities  5.4 
(1.1) 
70.7 0.076 
REVENUES        
Total     18.5 
(5.0) 
953.6 0.019 
 Intergovernmental    5.6 
(2.0) 
273.6 0.020 





 Total  Own    12.8 
(3.5) 
680.0 0.019 
   All  Taxes  4.1 
(1.7) 
392.2 0.010 
   Utility  Charges  4.0 
(0.8) 
56.3 0.071 
INDEBTEDNESS        
Total Debt    16.3 
(8.3) 
904.3 0.018 
 Nonguaranteed  Debt    12.8 
(6.7) 
543.4 0.024 
Notes: The entries in column (1) are estimates of β and their heteroskedastic consistent standard errors 
from the fitting of equation (7).  The rows identify the dependent variables, all of which are measured in 
millions of dollars.  Column (2) reports the mean of the dependent variable in t-1 in winner counties and 
column (3) presents the ratio of the point estimates from (1) to the mean.  The data source is the Annual 
Survey of Governments. N = 4500. See the previous tables and the text for more details. Appendix Table 1: Distribution of Real Property Assessment 
Cycles by States in 1991 and Subsequent Years. 
Number of Years  
Between Revaluations 













Notes: The table reports the number of years between revaluations 
for the states in the preferred sample for the housing price 
regressions.  The results from this regression are reported in 
columns (3a) and (3b) of Table 6.  In some states, the assessment 
cycle varies within the state.  In these cases, the table reports the 
shortest of the revaluation periods.  The “Unknown” category is 
reserved for states where it was not possible to determine the 
assessment cycle.  The source for the information in this table is 
Appendix D of the 1992 Census of Governments, Volume 2 
Taxable Property Values, Number 1 Assessed Valuations for 
Local General Property Taxation.  
 
   
 
 Appendix Table 2: The “Million Dollar Plants” and the Winner and Loser Counties 
  Case  
Number 
Plant Owner  (Industry)  Winner/ 
Loser 





1  Timken (Mnfg)  Winner  Stark, OH      Loser  El Paso, CO 
    Loser  Montgomery, VA      Loser  Bernalillo, NM 
2  General Electric (Mnfg)  Winner  Lowndes, AL  16  Ft. Howard Paper (Mnfg)  Winner  Effingham, GA 
    Loser  Posey, IN      Loser  Jasper, SC 
3      Racal-Milgo  (Services) Winner Broward, FL  17  Rockwell International (Mnfg)  Winner  Johnson, IA 
    Loser  Dade, FL      Loser  Linn, IA 
    Loser  Pasco, FL  18  Saturn (Mnfg)  Winner  Maury, TN 
4  Pitney-Bowes (Services)  Winner  Fayette, GA      Loser  Grayson, TX 
    Loser  Hamilton, OH      Loser  Kalamazoo, MI 
5  Corning/Kroger (Mnfg)  Winner  Clark, KY      Loser  Shelby, KY 
    Loser  Montgomery, KY  19  Toyota (Mnfg)  Winner  Scott, KY 
6  Verbatim (Mnfg)  Winner  Mecklenburg, NC      Loser  Wilson, TN 
    Loser  Wake, NC      Loser  Wyandotte, KS 
7 
American Solar King 
(Mnfg)  Winner  McLennan, TX  20  Canon (Mnfg)  Winner  Newport News, VA 
    Loser  Suffolk, MA      Loser  Henrico, VA 
8  Hewlett-Packard (Mnfg)  Winner  Snohomish, WA  21  DuPont/Phillips (Mnfg)  Winner  Cleveland, NC 
    Loser  King, WA      Loser  Durham, NC 
    Loser  Larimer, CO  22  Nippon Columbia (Mnfg)  Winner  Morgan, GA 
    Loser  Santa Clara, CA      Loser  Buncombe, NC 
9  General Motors (Mnfg)  Winner  St. Charles, MO  23  Mack (Mnfg)  Winner  Fairfield, SC 
    Loser  St. Louis, MO      Loser  Richland, SC 
9  Whirlpool (Mnfg)  Winner  Rutherford, TN      Loser  Lehigh, PA 
    Loser  Vanderburgh, IN  24  Fuji/Isuzu (Mnfg)  Winner  Tippecanoe, IN 
11  Codex (Motorola) (Mnfg)  Winner  Middlesex, MA      Loser  Sangamon, IL 
    Loser  Bristol, MA      Loser  Hardin, KY 
12  Tubular Corp (Mnfg)  Winner  Muskogee, OK  25  Boeing (Mnfg)  Winner  Calcasieu, LA 
    Loser  Phillips, AR      Loser  Oklahoma, OK 
13  TRW (Services)  Winner  Fairfax, VA      Loser  Duval, FL 
    Loser  Loudoun, VA  26  Yamaha (Mnfg)  Winner  Coweta, GA 
    Loser  Montgomery, MD      Loser  Kendall, IL 
14  Kyocera (Mnfg)  Winner  Clark, WA  27  Carnation (Mnfg)  Winner  Kern, CA 
    Loser  E. Baton Rouge, LA      Loser  Stanislaus, CA 
    Loser  Travis, TX  28  Knauf Fiber Glass (Mnfg)  Winner  Chambers, AL 
    Loser  Bernalillo, NM      Loser  Muscogee, GA 
    Loser  Nueces, TX      Loser  Russell, AL 
15  AiResearch (Mnfg)  Winner  Pima, AZ      Loser  Troup, GA Case  
Number 
Plant Owner  (Industry)  Winner/
Loser 





29  Nippon Kokan (NKK) (Mnfg)  Winner  Linn, OR      Loser  Hamilton, IN 
    Loser            Pierce,  WA Loser Ventura,  CA
30  Dresser Rand (Ingers) (Mnfg)  Winner  Allegany, NY  43  Formosa Plastics (Mnfg)  Winner  Calhoun, TX 
    Loser        Hartford,  CT     Loser Galveston,  TX
31    Worlmark  (Mnfg) Winner  Hancock, KY      Loser  Nueces, TX 
    Loser  Daviess, KY  44  Philips Display (Mnfg)  Winner  Washtenaw, MI 
    Loser  Perry, IN       Loser  Seneca, NY 
32  Eastman Kodak (Mnfg)  Winner  Chester, PA       Loser  Wood, OH 
    Loser  Philadelphia, PA       Loser  Lucas, OH 
       Loser  Delaware, PA   45 Wal-Mart  Stores (Trade)  Winner  Larimer, CO 
            Loser Montgomery,  PA     Loser Laramie,  WY
            Loser Bucks,  PA  Loser Weld,  CO 
33  Albertson's (Trade)  Winner  Multnomah, OR      Loser  Boulder, CO 
    Loser  Washington, OR  46  Ideal Security Hardw (Mnfg)  Winner  Washington, TN 
        Loser King,  WA      Loser Ramsey,  MN 
34  Metal Container (A-B) (Mnfg)  Winner  Jefferson, WI  47 
Burlington Air Express (Tran & 
Util) Winner      Lucas, OH
    Loser      Rock,  WI      Loser Allen,  IN
    Loser  DeKalb, IL  48  Boeing (Mnfg)  Winner  Wichita, KS 
35  Anheuser-Busch (Mnfg)  Winner  Bartow, GA      Loser  Washington, MS 
     Loser  Hall, GA  49  Tennessee Eastman (Mnfg)  Winner  Sullivan, TN 
     Loser  Knox, TN      Loser  Richland, SC 
     Loser  De Kalb, GA  50  Bass (Services)  Winner  De Kalb, GA 
36  Kimberly-Clark (Mnfg)  Winner  Tulsa, OK      Loser  Orange, FL 
    Loser            Rogers,  OK Loser Shelby,  TN
37  Alumax (Mnfg)  Winner  Gwinnett, GA  51  Allied Signal (Mnfg)  Winner  Kershaw, SC 
    Loser  San Mateo, CA      Loser  Rensselaer, NY 
38  Toyota (Mnfg)  Winner  Scott, KY  52  Borden (Mnfg)  Winner  Cape May, NJ 
     Loser  Alameda, CA      Loser  Cumberland, ME 
39  Wella (Mnfg)  Winner  Henrico, VA  53  Reichhold Chemicals (Mnfg)  Winner  Durham, NC 
    Loser        Bergen,  NJ     Loser Westchester,  NY
40  Reebok International (Mnfg)  Winner  Middlesex, MA  54  Ford (Mnfg)  Winner  Montgomery, PA 
    Loser    Suffolk,  MA      Loser Delaware,  PA 
41  Squibb (Mnfg)  Winner  Camden, NJ  55  Burlington Northern (Tran & Util)  Winner  Tarrant, TX 
    Loser        Mercer,  NJ     Loser Johnson,  KS
42  GTE (Tran & Util)  Winner  Dallas, TX      Loser  Ramsey, MN 
    Loser  Hillsborough, FL  56  Holiday (Services)  Winner  De Kalb, GA Case  
Number 
Plant Owner (Industry)  Winner/
Loser 





    Loser  Shelby, TN  70  BMW (Mnfg)  Winner  Greenville, SC 
57  Adidas USA (Mnfg)  Winner  Spartanburg, SC      Loser  Douglas, NE 
    Loser  Somerset, NJ  71  National Steel (Mnfg)  Winner  St. Joseph, IN 
58  American Auto (Services)  Winner  Seminole, FL      Loser  Allegheny, PA 
                 Loser Fairfax, VA 72
MCI Communications (Tran & 
Util) Winner Dade, FL
59  United Airlines (Tran & Util)  Winner  Denver, CO      Loser  Duval, FL 
    Loser  Champaign, IL  73  Everest & Jennings (Mnfg)  Winner  St. Louis, MO 
            Loser Oklahoma,  OK     Loser Ventura,  CA
    Loser  Marion, IN  74  Swearingen Aircraft (Mnfg)  Winner  Berkeley, WV 
    Loser  Guilford, NC      Loser  New Castle, DE 
    Loser  Fairfax, VA  75  Evenflo Products (Mnfg)  Winner  Cherokee, GA 
            Loser Berkeley,  WV     Loser Cuyahoga,  OH
    Loser  Hamilton, OH  76  Sterling Drug (Mnfg)  Winner  Montgomery, PA 
            Loser Jefferson,  KY     Loser Rensselaer,  NY
60  Sterilite (Mnfg)  Winner  Jefferson, AL  77  JLM Industries (Mnfg)  Winner  Hillsborough, FL 
              Loser Lauderdale, TN   Loser  Fairfield, CT  
61  Wal-Mart Stores (Trade)  Winner  Hernando, FL  78  B&W Tobacco (Mnfg)  Winner  Bibb, GA 
    Loser      Polk,  FL      Loser Jefferson,  KY
62  Volvo North America (Mnfg)  Winner  Chesapeake, VA  79  Greyhound Lines (Tran & Util)  Winner  Dallas, TX 
    Loser    Bergen,  NJ      Loser Polk,  IA 
63    AMF/Reece  (Mnfg) Winner  Hanover, VA  80  Transkrit (Mnfg)  Winner  Roanoke, VA 
    Loser        Middlesex,  MA     Loser Westchester,  NY
64  Boeing (Mnfg)  Winner  Snohomish, WA  81  Mercedes-Benz (Mnfg)  Winner  Tuscaloosa, AL 
    Loser    Kitsap,  WA      Loser Berkeley,  SC 
65  United Airlines (Tran & Util)  Winner  Marion, IN      Loser  Clarke, GA 
    Loser            Denver,  CO Loser Alamance,  NC
66  Scott Paper (Mnfg)  Winner  Daviess, KY      Loser  Chester, SC 
    Loser          Posey,  IN  Loser Durham,  NC
67  Safeway (Trade)  Winner  San Joaquin, CA      Loser  Douglas, NE 
    Loser            Sacramento,  CA Loser Anderson,  TN
68  AT&T (Tran & Util)  Winner  Mecklenburg, NC  82        Schlegel  (Mnfg) Winner Rockingham,  NC
    Loser    Berkeley,  WV      Loser Guilford,  NC 
           Loser Placer, CA      
69  GE Capital Services (Financials)  Winner  Fulton, GA         
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